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Chernick: Disclosure of Corporate Payments Abroad and the Concept of Materi

DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE PAYMENTS
ABROAD AND THE CONCEPT OF MATERIALITY
The controversial subject of corporate payments abroad,
widely reported in the press during the past year and also the
focus of numerous governmental investigations,' raises several
problems with respect to federal securities regulation. Foremost,
and the particular concern of this article, is whether the Securities and Exchange Commission acts within the scope of its authority when it requires public disclosure by American corporations of corporate expenditures abroad. Critics charge that by
requiring public disclosure the Commission is imposing its own
standards of appropriate business conduct2 on both domestic
companies and foreign governments.
At the crux of the controversy is the determination of what
constitutes a "material" fact that must be disclosed to investors.
This article will review the expanding and elusive concept of
materiality, and examine several factors which may be helpful in
measuring whether a particular payment or questionable activity
is material. Such a discussion should be useful, not merely with
regard to the present bribery scandal, but as a guide to analyzing
future demands by investors for information which was not pre1. Investigations have been made by numerous bodies and agencies including the
Internal Revenue Service, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 1, 1975, at 54; the Securities and Exchange
Commission, N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1976, § 4 (The Week in Review), at 3, col. 1; the Senate
Banking Committee, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 1, 1975, at 50; the Senate Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, N.Y. Times, Feb. 25,
1976, at 1, col. 5. President Ford has appointed Secretary of Commerce Elliot Richardson
to head a new Cabinet-level task force to consider the foreign payments matter. Wall St.
J., Apr. 9, 1976, at 3, col. 3. Payments are being made directly to the host country officials
involved in the governmental decisionmaking process, SEC v. United Brands Co.,
(Currentl CCH FED. SEC. L. RFP. 95,420 (D.D.C. Jan. 27, 1976), to local agents who
know which people to pay and how much, Griffith, Payoff is Not "Accepted Practice,"
FORTUNF. Aug. 1975, at 122, or to political parties in the form of contributions. Id. at 124.
See Wall St. J., May 19, 1975, at 1, col. 6.
An investigation conducted by the SEC revealed the widespread existence of secret
slush funds and falsified books which concealed from shareholders, and often directors
alike, the actual use of corporate funds. In the view of the SEC, Commissioner Phillip A.
Loomis, Jr. said, this "necessarily rendered inaccurate the financial statements filed with
the Commission." N.Y. Times, June 18, 1975, at 56, col. 3. The SEC moved to require
disclosure of "'anything that is material . . . [and which] pertains to the quality of a
company's earnings and the high-risk methods of a company's doing business."' Smith,
S.E.C.'s Tough Guy, N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1975, § 3 (Business & Finance), at 5, col. 2,
quoting Stanley Sporkin, Chief of the SEC Division of Enforcement.
2. Phillips & Crosland, Jr., SEC Must Avoid Imposing Enforcement "Confessionals"
Under Guise of "Materiality," 174 N.Y.L.J. 114, Dec. 15, 1975, at 25, col. 1.
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viously considered material for investment decisionmaking and
therefore was not disclosed.
BACKGROUND

"The keystone of the entire structure of Federal securities
legislation is disclosure."' 3 The Securities Act of 1933 4-the "truth
in securities" bill-requires that companies selling securities to
the public disclose the factual data necessary for an investor to
make a rational investment decision. 5 The ground rule of federal
securities regulation is that the government will not judge the
quality of any security, but will mandate the disclosure of necessary information so that in a fair, free, and open market, the
security will rise or fall on its own merit. In his message to Congress on March 29, 1933, President Franklin D. Roosevelt said:
"This proposal adds to the ancient rule of caveat emptor, the
further doctrine 'let the seller also beware.' It puts the burden of
' 7
telling the whole truth on the seller.
Under the 1933 Act and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,8
the Commission may require disclosure of information that is
"necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors," 9 or "to insure fair dealing in the security.",'
Rule 10b-5, promulgated under the 1934 Act, makes it unlawful
"[tlo make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit
to state a material fact. . . ."" In order to protect investors, the
3. SEC. REPORT OF SPECIAL. STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th
Cong.. ist Sess. (1963).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1971).
5. Knauss, A Reappraisalof the Role of Disclosure, 62 MICH. L. REV. 607, 608 (1964);
see In re Universal Camera Corp., 19 S.E.C. 648 (1948); Douglas & Bates, The Federal
Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171 (1933).
6. See Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1972).
7. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., Ist Sess. 937 (1933); see, e.g., 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES
REGU-::'INON 1435 (2d ed. 1961); SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180
(1963): SEC v. Great Am. Indus., Inc., 407 F.2d 453, 462-63 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc)
(Kaufman, J., concurring), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 920 (1969); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co.. 401 F.2d 833, 855 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). The 1933
Act is concerned with the disclosure of favorable as well as unfavorable facts. Folk, Civil
Liabilities tinder the Federal Securities Acts: The BarChrisCase, 1 SECURITIES L. REV. 3,
13 (1969) (reprinted from 55 VA. L. REV. 1 (1969)).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1971).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 781(b)(1) (1971).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (1971).
11. SEC Rule 10b-5 was adopted in 1942 by the Commission under the Federal
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), on the basis of a recommendation by the staff. The rule reads as follows:
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Commission has promulgated regulations under section 6 of the
Securities Act of 1933 and sections 12, 13, and 14 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. These regulations require corporations to
furnish in registration statements, annual or quarterly reports,
and reports included in proxy statements, information that is
"material" and "necessary" to make the reports or statements
2
fair representations and not misleading.'
The broad disclosure requirement is aimed at matters of economic significance to the investor, and is not designed as a substitute for business regulation. Disclosure can be validly utilized,
however, as an indirect form of pressure on corporations to influence conduct. For example, several items required to be disclosed
3
are of little interest to investors and yet must be revealed:'
[Rlequirements in the prospectus and proxy statements relating to management compensation and transactions between
management and the company may be of marginal value ...
Nevertheless, compelling such disclosure may be justified as
imposing a moderating influence on corporate compensation
and as encouraging the elimination of as many conflict of interest opportunities as possible.
The traditional view is that appropriate publicity tends to discourage questionable practices and elevate standards of business
conduct.'4 As long as the disclosure requirements are rooted in
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or the mails or of any facility
of any national securities exchange
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made in the light of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1975). Other antifraud provisions include § 17(a)( 2 ) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1971) and § 14(e) of the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e)
(1971).
12. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-20 (1975).
13. Mundheim, Selected Trends in DisclosureRequirements for Public Corporations,
7 SECURITIES L. REV. 45, 69 (1975) (reprinted from 3 SECURriEs REGULATION L.J. 3 (1975)).
14. Summary of Report on Disclosure to Investors (Wheat Report), [Special Studies
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.

74,602 (1969).

The existence of bonuses, of excessive commissions and salaries, of preferential
lists and the like, may all be open secrets among the knowing, but the knowing
are few. There is a shrinking quality to such transactions; to force knowledge of
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terms of economic significance, their secondary function as tools
for regulating conduct are considered justifiable.
Since securities regulation centers on the policy of disclosure, it is understandable that the entire system depends upon
the integrity of full and accurate reporting and the maintenance
of complete records. In the market system, as in the court system,
the appearance of honesty and fairness is as important as honesty
and fairness.' 5 Securities regulation, enacted in the aftermath of
the financial community's greatest crisis and during the nation's
most severe depression, was designed by Congress not merely to
provide information to investors, but to restore confidence in the
investment system."
MATERIALITY

Rule 405, promulgated under the 1933 Act, provides:17
The term "material" when used to qualify a requirement for the
furnishing of information as to any subject, limits the information required to those matters as to which an average prudent
investor ought reasonably to be informed before purchasing the
security registered.
The average prudent investor is not concerned with the omission
of insignificant details or with minor inaccuracies. Investors who
are contemplating a purchase or sale are interested only in those
"facts which have an important bearing upon the nature or condition of the issuing corporation or its business."' 8 Determination
them into the open is largely to restrain their happening. Many practices safely
pursued in private lose their justification in public. Thus social standards
newly-defined gradually establish themselves as new business habits.
Frankfurter, The FederalSecurities Act: II, FORTUNE, Aug. 1933, at 55.
15. See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 172 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
16. President Roosevelt explained in a message to Congress that securities legislation
was necessary for "what we seek is a return to a clearer understanding of the ancient truth
that those who manage. . . other people's money are trustees acting for others." 77 CONG.
R~e. 937 (1933).
Representative Sam Rayburn said:

the purpose of the bill is to place the owners of securities on a parity, so far as
is possible, with the management of the corporations, and to place the buyer

on the same plane so far as available information is concerned, with the seller.
..When
W
a people's faith is shaken in a business the business becomes
halting and lame . . ..
77 CONG. REC. 2918, 2919 (1933).

17. 17 C.F.R. § 230.405(1) (1975).
18. Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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of materiality is a prerequisite to evaluating whether there is
liability on the part of persons obligated to make disclosure.
"Materiality in the abstract is a meaningless concept."' 9 Materiality, within the meaning of the securities acts, is the significance of the misstatement or omission of fact under consideration
to a reasonable investor's judgment in deciding to buy or sell.
Notwithstanding the Act's attempt to define materiality, it remains an elusive concept.2 1 Its meaning can be defined only by
examining all aspects of a particular transaction.
JudicialInterpretation of Materiality
Authorities are divided on the nature of the burden of proof
necessary for a plaintiff to establish materiality. The ALI Federal
Securities Code ' adopts the position of the First Restatement of
Torts2 2 that materiality is determined by whether "a reasonable
man would attach importance [to the fact misrepresented] in
determining his choice of action in the transaction in question."
A considerably lower threshold of proof than the "would" standard defines materiality as those facts "which in reasonable and
objective contemplation might affect the value of the corporation's stock or securities" or which "might have been considered
important by a reasonable shareholder who was in the process of
24
determining how to vote. 1
The Supreme Court used the "might" test in Mills v. Electric
Auto-Lite Co.,25 but also included language that arguably limits
26
a broad reading of the "might" test:
19. R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION 1129 (1972).
20. See Sommer, The Slippery Slope of Materiality, 174 N.Y.L.J. 114, Dec. 15, 1975,
at 1, col. 2.
21. ALI FEDERAL SECURITIFS CODE § 256 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1973).
22. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 538(2)(a) (1938) (emphasis added); accord,
Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 604 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873
(1974); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1301-03 (2d Cir. 1973); Speed v.
Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 829-30 (D. Del. 1951), aff'd, 235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir.
1956); 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMEs. THE LAW OF TORTS 565-66 (1956).
23. Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 642 (7th Cir. 1963). See also Affiliated Ute
Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972); SEC v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d 1301, 1305 (2d
Cir. 1974); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 719 (1971).
24. Northway v. TSC Industries, 512 F.2d 324, 332 (7th Cir.) (emphasis added), cert.
granted, 96 S. Ct. 33 (1975), quoting Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 384
(1970).
25. 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
26. Id. at 384 (emphasis in original). The outcome of Northway v. TSC Industries,
512 F.2d 324 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 33 (1975), should end the uncertainty that
has existed since the Mills decision. The difference between "might" and "significant
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Where the misstatement or omission in a proxy statement
has been shown to be "material," as it was found to be here, that
determination itself indubitably embodies a conclusion that the
defect was of such a character that it might have been considered important by a reasonable shareholder who was in the process of deciding how to vote. . . .This requirement that the
defect have a significant propensity to affect the voting process
is found in the express terms of Rule 14a-9, and it adequately
serves the purpose of ensuring that a cause of action cannot be
established by proof of a defect so trivial, or so unrelated to the
transaction for which approval is sought, that correction of the
defect or imposition of liability would not further the interests
protected by § 14(a). [Citations omitted.]
Two years later, however, the Court made no reference in a
10b-5 case to the "significant propensity" designation. In
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States,27 the Court indicated
that the following is the correct test to be applied to determine
materiality:2
Under the circumstances of this case, involving primarily a
failure to disclose, positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite
to recovery. All that is necessary is that the facts withheld be
material in the sense that a reasonable investor might have
considered them important in the making of this decision.
[Citations omitted.]
Several courts,29 particularly in the Second Circuit, have
propensity" may appear to be negligible, but Judge Swygert's opinion in Northway demonstrates the importance of the distinction:
Different results could flow from a test requiring only that the omitted fact
"might have been considered important by a reasonable shareholder who was

in the process of deciding how to vote" than would flow from a test requiring
that the fact have "a significant propensity to affect the voting process."
(Footnote omitted.] On a motion for summary judgment, the "might have"
test would ask whether a reasonable mind could conclude that the omitted fact
is so irrelevant that it would never reasonably be considered important. The

"significant propensity" test would ask whether a reasonable mind could conclude that the fact is less than significant in its potential to affect the voting
process. Many facts which are relevant within the first test could reasonably be
said to have less than a significant propensity to affect the voting process taken
as a whole, even though for some few stockholders these same facts could be
determinative.
Id. at 330.
27. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
28. Id. at 153-54; see SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968)
(en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
29. See, e.g., Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 604 (5th Cir.), cert.
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expressed dissatisfaction with the "might" test. Judge Friendly
of the Second Circuit rejected the test as being "too suggestive
of mere possibility, however unlikely."3 He preferred instead the
"significant propensity" test enunciated in Mills, because the
language "comes closer to the right flavor.' ' 3 In fact, Judge
Friendly seems to have combined the "might" and "significant
propensity" tests in 1968, in General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus33
tries, Inc. ,32 another section 14(a) case. He stated:
The test, we suppose, is whether, taking a properly realistic
view, there is a substantiallikelihood that the misstatement or
omission may have led a stockholder to grant a proxy to the
solicitor or to withhold one from the other side, whereas in the
absence of this he would have taken a contrary course.
The question of which materiality standard applies clearly
influences the determination of whether a particular fact will be
held to be material. Resolution of the "would," "might," and
"substantial likelihood. . . may" controversy, however, will only
provide a departure point for analysis.
Viewing Materiality as Consisting of QuantitativeData
Material information has traditionally been viewed from a
quantitative perspective. Investors and the Commission have
usually considered balance sheet profit and loss informationhard data-as important. Examples of material items also
34
include:
[Miaterial changes from period to period in the amounts of the
items of revenues and expenses, .... [and] changes in accounting principles or practices.
. . .Changes in product mix or in the relative profitability
of lines of business; changes in advertising, research, developdenied, 410 U.S. 873 (1974); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1302 (2d Cir.
1973).
30. Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1302 (2d Cir. 1973).
31. Id.
32. 403 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969); see Northway v.
TSC Industries, 512 F.2d 324, 331 n.13 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 33 (1975), where
the court agreed that Judge Friendly had applied a "mixed" test in General Time.
33. Id. at 162 (emphasis added).
34. SEC, Guides for Preparationand Filing of Reports and RegistrationStatements
under the Securities ExchangeAct of 1934, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 23,060, at 17,071-3
to 17,071-4 (1974).
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ment, or product introduction or other discretionary costs;...
acquisition or disposition of a material asset other than in the
ordinary course of business;. . . unusual charges or gains... ;
changes in assumptions underlying deferred costs and the plan
for amortization . . . [and] changes in assumed investment
return and in actuarial assumptions used to calculate contributions to pension funds ....
Information viewed as material has also encompassed "dividend
information, . . . significant shifts in operating or financial circumstances, such as litigation, cash flow.reductions, major writeoffs, and strikes at major facilities. ' 35 Thus information has been
considered material when it is composed primarily of significant
economic and financial data.
The concept of materiality has been greatly expanded and
the resulting erosion of traditional financial and economic approaches to this concept has generated widespread confusion and
concern among members of the securities bar.36 Former
Commissioner A. A. Sommer, Jr. has observed that occasionally
the Commission staff will suggest that lengthy portions of a registration statement be omitted, only to find that counsel for underwriters and issuers insist upon disclosure for fear that a later court
might determine the omitted portion to be material.37
Commissioner Sommer, among others, regards the advent of
the "ethical" investor, one concerned about public interest ramifications in addition to profit, as an important factor in the increasing expansion of the concept of materiality.38 Social activist
groups have discovered that securities laws can be a means to
compel corporate disclosure of the role that the particular company plays in matters concerning equal employment, civil rights,
and environmental protection.39 It is more likely, however, that
pressure to expand the notion of materiality is partially due to the
fact that many investors have come to realize that traditional
information-profit and loss data-is no longer sufficient.
35. Flom & Atkins, The Expanding Scope of SEC Disclosure Laws, 52 HAV. Bus.
Rrv. 109, 113 (July-Aug. 1974).
36. Address by former Commissioner A.A. Sommer, Jr., Practising Law Institute
Seminar on Materiality, in New York City, Dec. 8, 1975. See also Sommer, supra note
20, at 1.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See note 129 infra and accompanying text.
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IncorporatingOther Factors to a Determinationof Materiality
There are four tests which might be more beneficial to a
determination of materiality than the use of a traditional quantitative approach. The first of these tests is to examine materiality
in terms of information that scrutinizes management's integrity
and ability. It is universally recognized that the quality of management is crucial in evaluating the ultimate success or failure of
a business enterprise." In In re FranchardCorp.," a prospectus
which omitted any reference to improper withdrawals of money
by the chief executive officer for his personal use was held to be
materially deficient. 4 Even though the principal's indebtedness
to the registrant never exceeded 1.5 percent of the gross book
value of the registrant's assets, the Commission ruled that the
significance of the transaction turned not on dollar amounts in
relation to equity or cash flow, but on the importance to prospective investors of information concerning the officer's managerial
ability and personal integrity. 3 In another case, the failure to
disclose that officers and directors faced derivative litigation for
fraud and breach of fiduciary duty was held by the court to be a
material omission. 41 In Cooke v. Teleprompter Corp.," the fact
that the chairman and chief executive officer had been convicted
of bribery and perjury was held to be material. Similarly, in SEC
v. Kalvex"6 proxy material which failed to reveal that a director
and officer received kickbacks from the corporation's business
transactions was held to be false and misleading.
The Commission further supported the view that an investor
is entitled to have information about management integrity when
40. See, e.g., R.

BADGER,

H.

TORGERSON

& H.

GUTHMAN, INVESTMENT PRINCIPLES AND

PRACTICES 181 (5th ed. 1961); B. GRAHAM, D. DODD & C. COTrLE, SECURITY ANALYSIS 66367 (4th ed. 1962).
41. [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 77,113 (SEC 1964).
42. Id. at 82,041.
43. Id. at 82,043.
44. Beatty v. Bright, 318 F. Supp. 169 (S.D. Iowa 1970).
45. 334 F. Supp. 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
46. [Current] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
95,226 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 1975). See also
Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. v. Independent Stockholders Comm., 354 F. Supp. 895 (D.
Del. 1973) (illegal solicitation of proxy material); Rafal v. Geneen, 11972-1973 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. "SEC. L. REP.
93,505 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (insider trading violations);
Robinson v. Penn Central Co., 336 F. Supp. 655 (E.D. Pa. 1971). In this case a proxy
statement for stockholder approval of a refinancing plan did not clarify to the reasonable
and unsophisticated stockholder the serious consequences that the plan would have on the
company.
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it issued Securities Act Release No. 5466.11 In the context of illegal
8
domestic campaign contributions, the Commission ruled that:
[T]he conviction of a corporation and/or its officers or directors
for having made illegal campaign contributions in violation of
18 U.S.C. Section 610 is a material fact that should be disclosed
to the public and specifically to shareholders, particularly in the
context of a proxy statement where shareholders are being asked
to vote for management. Such a conviction is material to an
evaluation of the integrity of the management of the corporation
as it relates to the operation of the corporation and the use of
corporate funds.
The Commission also concluded that any pending indictment
49
under the Act "should" be disclosed.
Although it is true that the majority of the aforementioned
lawsuits concerned management that catered to self-interest,
often at the expense of the company, these cases nonetheless
established a growing awareness that corporate methods and
scruples are relevant to the investor. The concept of materiality
must be sufficiently broad, therefore, to encompass information
pertaining to the quality and integrity of management.
A second guide to a determination of materiality is to analyze
whether a substantial number of shareholders want the information. It has been suggested that information not usually regarded
as crucial to investment decisionmaking can become material
when a significant percentage of investors determine that a factor
might be worthy of consideration."' In Feit v. Leasco Data
ProcessingEquipment Corp.,' a case involving the adequacy of
disclosure in a prospectus, District Judge Jack B. Weinstein pro47. 11973-1974 Transfer Binderl CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,699 (Mar. 8, 1974).
48. Id. at 83,874.
49. Id. Whether this means that the Division of Enforcement will regard nondisclosure of a pending indictment as "material" is not clear. The final sentence of the release
characterizes management as being in "the best position" to determine if disclosure is
necessary.
In Lyman v. Standard Brands, Inc., 364 F. Supp. 794 (E.D. Pa. 1973), the fact that
three members of the proposed independent auditor's office were indicted for violations
of the federal securities laws was held to be immaterial. In Lyman, the accounting firm
had 749 partners, 10,577 employees, and the indicted accountants were not working on
this account.
50. Bevis Longstreth spoke of this "statistical" approach in a seminar sponsored by
the American Bar Association in 1972. Sommer, The Slippery Slope of Materiality, 174
N.Y.L.J. 114, Dec. 15, 1975, at 4, col. 1.
51. 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
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posed using a statistical solution to determine whether "it is more
probable than not that a significant number of traders would
have wanted to know [the fact] before deciding to deal in the
security at the time and price in question." 52 He suggested that
if 10 percent of either the number of potential traders or those
potentially making 10 percent of the total number of sales
claimed that they would have wanted to know the fact in question
before making a decision, that would be sufficient for maintain3
ing that the fact was material.1
This concept of polling investors to determine materiality
could be adopted in two ways. First, investors of a particular
company might demand specific information from their
company's management, and the results of a survey of investors
would be an indication (to a court, if necessary) whether significant numbers of investors of that company desired the nondisclosed facts. Second, if significant numbers of investors were
to petition the SEC and request that certain data be disclosed,
the Commission would then mandate the release of that information. Since materiality is defined in terms of information for the
"average" or "reasonable" investor, if more than an incidental
number of investors demand information not previously disclosed, the notion of what is, or should be, material would be
altered to adjust to the needs of the "new" average investor. 4
A third approach to a determination of materiality is to assess the significance of business affected where a quantitative
approach is inadequate. Accountants and auditors have long had
to decide what constitutes a material item for disclosure purposes. This has been done by examining the amount in question.
An expense, for example, which exceeds 5 percent 5 of all expenditures, must be itemized. Sometimes the figure used is as high as
10 percent. 5 Where, however, an item is less than a particular
percentage and ordinarily not disclosed, it can nevertheless have
a greater impact than the quantitative data would indicate.
It is conceivable that a substantial amount of a company's
business could be affected indirectly by an item which would
otherwise seem trifling. The cost of fuel or raw materials may -be
52.
53.
54.
55.
also id.
56.

Id. at 571.
Id.
See note 145 infra and accompanying text.
DEFIESE, JOHNSON & MACLEOD, MONTGoMERY's AUDITING

at 32-34.
E. HENDRIKSON.

AcCOUNTINc.THEORY

35 (9th ed. 1975). See

562 (rev. ed. 1970).
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a relatively small amount, but shortages of these items could
retard production.'Y The risk characteristics of certain assets have
been substantially changed by recent economic conditions; assumptions which have formed the basis of accounting principles
in some situations are now subject to extreme uncertainty. s The
Commission has recognized these possibilities and recently ordered the disclosure of unusual risks and uncertainties in financial reporting. 9 This means that an item can become material
even though it does not now significantly affect business.
A fourth approach to determining materiality is to examine
the accuracy and integrity of the books and records of the corporation. Implicit in investor confidence in a company's financial
accounting is the honesty and accuracy of its reporting system. 0
Financial accountability is contingent upon the maintenance of
complete and reliable reporting; failure to so account is a serious
violation of the federal securities laws. Disclosure of falsified accounting records or utilization of unrecorded cash funds would
certainly cast doubt on everything else reported by management.
Integrity in the financial statement has "always been the foundation stone of the entire disclosure system." 6 '
FOREIGN PAYMENTS IN THE MATERIALITY SCHEME

Recent Disclosuresof Bribery
Bribes and other payments in the course of business are by
57. Disclosure of Impact of Possible Fuel Shortages, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder]
C(CH FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,607 (Dec. 20,. 1973).
58. Disclosure of Unusual Risks and Uncertaintiesin FinancialReporting, 5 CCH
FED, SEC. L. REP. 72,188, at 62,430-31 (Dec. 23, 1974); see note 145 infra.
59. Id. at 62,431.
60. False financial reporting is extremely serious. Even where the purpose of fraudulent reporting, as in one case, was to defraud the government and not investors, and the
independent auditors who were charged with the fraud had not personally gained from
the misstatements, liability was found by the court. Investors and the public were
nevertheless hurt because the purpose of financial reporting is to "inform the man on the
street" and to have truthful information in buying. The alleged misstatements misled the
public and fraudulently induced the sale of securities. Drake v. Thor Power Tool Co., 282
F. Supp. 94, 104 (N.D. Il1. 1967).
61. N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1975, at 53, col. 3, quoting Alan B. Levenson, Former Director of the Division of Corporate Finance, SEC. Former Chairman Garrett expressed the
same view in Homily on the Glories of Right Conduct and the Wages of Sin, American
Society of Corporate Secretaries, June 27, 1975; accord, Commissioner Sommer, The
Limits of Disclosure, Address before the Wharton-AICPA Advanced Management Program for CPA Firm Partners, June 24, 1975; Commissioner Loomis, Statement before
Subcomm. on Int'l Economic Policy of the House Comm. on Int'l Relations, at 5, June
17, 1975 (prepared but not delivered on that date). Copies of the speeches are available
from the Securities and Exchange Commission.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol4/iss3/6

12

Chernick: Disclosure of Corporate Payments Abroad and the Concept of Materi

Materiality of Payments Abroad

no means of recent origin. In the 1600's, the British East India
Company gave Mogul rulers "'rare treasures,' including paintings, carvings, and 'costly objects made of copper, brass, and
stone' ",62 in exchange for duty-free treatment for its exports. Although the practice appears to be long-standing, the magnitude
of the payments is not.63
The least common and least subtle form of bribery is exemplified by the experience of the United Brands Company which
paid $1.25 million to the President of Honduras to secure a reduction of the export tax on bananas. 4 The bribe was made in a
desperate effort to save the company after it had suffered devastating losses caused by a hurricane. 5
Bribes have also taken the form of contributions to political
parties. Mobil Oil Corporation allegedly contributed $2 million to
Italian political parties and recorded the payments as advertising
and research expenditures. 6 Exxon purportedly paid $46 million
between 1963 and 1972 for secret political contributions. 7 Lockheed, by its own admission, has paid $22 million since 1970 to
political parties and government officials, while some reports
claim the figure is closer to $200 million. 8 Gulf Oil Corporation
contributed $3 million to the party of President Park of South
Korea after Gulf's former President Dorsey was told by the chief
fundraiser, in terms "that left little to the imagination,"6 that
the company's $300 million investment would not otherwise be
safe.70 These contributions, often reported to be legal in the countries in which they are made, may, in fact, be illegal. 71 For example, in Italy there appears to be a dispute whether contributions
62. Gwirtzman, Is Bribery Defensible?, N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1975, § 6 (Magazine), at
19, cols. 2-3. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Mr. Gwirtzman.
63. Over a three-year period, for example, Northrop Corporation (a major aerospace
concern) reportedly paid out $30 million, about equal to the company's total net income
for that same three-year period. FORTUNE, supra note 1, at 202.
64. Statement by United Brands Co., Wall St. J., Apr. 9, 1975, at 1, col. 6.
65. Id. at 23, col. 2. The United Brands situation has been one of the most widely
reported examples of corporate bribery. While it is usually noted in the press that the
company's chairman, Eli Black, most certainly knew of and approved the plan, it is less
often reported that he preferred and frequently utilized social contributions, the public
donation of hospitals, medical supplies, and emergency aid, to ingratiate the company
with the host country. Id. at 21, col. 2.
66. Wall St. J., July 18, 1975, at 12, col. 2.
67. Wall St. J., July 14, 1975, at 10, col. 2.
68. NEWSWEEK, Sept. 1, 1975, at 50.

69.

NEWSWEEK,

May 26, 1975, at 65.

70. Id.
71. Id. at 66.
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can be made legally by corporations. Government sources argue
that payments are legal in Italy if there is shareholder approval
and proper entry of records on company books.72 In the case of
Esso Italiana, for instance, the Exxon subsidiary which allegedly
contributed $46 million to Italian political parties, these two conditions were not met. Esso's sole shareholder (Exxon, Inc.) authorized the payments, thus fulfilling the first qualification.
There was not adequate compliance, however, with the second
part of the test: Esso did not disclose the real use of the funds in
their records and maintained that political parties did not want
73
the payments disclosed.
Monies have frequently been paid to influential persons by
an agent who receives 4 to 6 percent of the contract price for large
contracts, although the percentage can be as high as 25 percent
for smaller contracts. 74 Agents introduce the company to knowledgeable and important officials and brief the company on in75
dustrial, economic, and political policies cf the foreign country.
These agents also offer market and technical information, interpreter and translation services, counseling on local law, visa and
exit permits, and assistance in observing customs and traditions.
The agent may also serve the interests of the foreign government
by undertaking tasks that the officials could not in good
conscience perform themselves. In Saudi Arabia, for example,
sales agents execute documents providing for interest payments
since officials cannot, for religious reasons, sign such documents."
Some companies report that they must resort to the use of
agents in certain foreign countries in order to do business. Del
Monte Corporation tried for 18 months to buy a 55,000 acre banana plantation in Guatemala but the local government procrastinated. 7 The company eventually followed the suggestion of the
United States Ambassador which had been made at the outset
and hired a "consultant" for $500,000. Suddenly the government
72. N.Y. Times, July 13, 1975, § 1, at 22, cols. 3-4.
73. Prospectus of the Exxon Pipeline Co., Oct. 16, 1975.
74. FORTUNE, supra note 1, at 205.
75. Thomas V. Jones, President and Chairman of Northrop Corporation, explained
to the independent auditing committee commissioned by Northrop that "you don't attempt to go into these countries and bribe people, but that you have to know who you
should talk to and then just wait for the right opportunity to do so." Documents Relating
to Foreign Sales and Operations of the Northrop Corporation, at 70. A copy of this report
is on file in the office of the Hofstra Law Review.
76. Id. at 511-12.
77. Wall St. J., July 14, 1975, at 1, col. 6.
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reversed itself.18 That experience is common, according to interviews of American business executives conducted by the Wall
Street Journal.7 9 Many companies "operate through local distributors, representatives, sales agents or ill-defined 'consultants'
who are well-connected citizens" who spread the cash around."
There are some major companies such as Xerox, I.B.M. and
R.C.A. which purportedly refuse to participate in these types of
activities regardless of the gains to be made.81 Other companies,
particularly the highly regulated natural resources companies or
capital investment companies (such as aerospace which must rely
heavily upon government contracts) find that they must pay
bribes, kickbacks, political contributions, and agent's fees in
82
order to transact business abroad.
Analyzing Bribery Under the Four Tests of Materiality
In analyzing the materiality of bribery, the threshold
question is whether the information is the sort that an average,
reasonable investor "might" need, or in "substantial likelihood
. . . may" need, in order to make an investment decision." When
economic information is directly related to an evaluation of the
worth of a security, the information is "material" to the decisionmaking process.
As discussed earlier, a traditional determination of materiality requires the examination of amounts in question and other
quantitative data. 4 Since the companies involved in the bribery
78. Id.
79. Wall St. J., May 9, 1975, at 10, col. 2.
80. Id.

81.

FORTUNE,

supra note 1, at 122.

82. Crittenden, Closing In on CorporatePayoffs Overseas,N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1976,
§ 3 (Business & Finance), at 1, col. 4, citing a survey of 73 American executives by the
Conference Board.
83. See notes 21-33 supra and accompanying text.
84. See notes 55 & 56 supra and accompanying text.
The accounting profession is in the process of deciding how to deal with the reporting
of foreign payments abroad. The Executive Committee on Auditing Standards of the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants has proposed a revised standard to be
voted upon by the membership of the A.I.C.P.A. The proposal adopts the traditional focus
of materiality, which is to examine the dollar amounts of a particular payment. In addition, however, it directs auditors to consider "the related contingent monetary effects."
Wall St. J., Apr. 19, 1976, at 8, col. 3. These would include "fines, penalties and damages,
and such 'loss contingencies' as expropriation." Id. The proposal also suggests that if a
substantial amount of business is contingent upon an illegal payment, that risk would
have to be disclosed. Id.; see notes 98-119 infra and accompanying text.
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controversy are, for the most part, large multinational
corporations, this approach is inapposite since the amount of
bribes will frequently be small, relative to that company's assets
or earnings. In the case of Lockheed any future amount paid in
bribes might well be regarded as material, since the Emergency
Loan Guarantee Board has warned the company that a repetition
of improper practices will subject Lockheed to the risk of losing
loan guarantees which substantially enable the corporation to
continue to operate. 85
Examining the legality of bribery or the general lack of enforcement of laws prohibiting the practice is likewise not a helpful
guide. Many of the foreign payments that have been disclosed by
SEC and congressional investigations were arranged by means
which were not illegal (for example the use of a sales agent or
consultant), yet still rendered the transactions riskier than might
appear to uninformed outsiders. The controversy which surrounds the utilization of "consultants" or "agents" stems not
from allegations of illegal conduct by the corporation, but from
the dubious activities of local citizens on behalf of the company.
Political contributions are also legal in some countries. Yet disclosure might reveal that management is being extorted by officials-a fact which could escalate into a more significant problem. General condonation by host law enforcement officials of
outright illegal activity may appear to obviate a need for concern.
Serious consequences could result, however, should a change of
governmental policy or personnel lead to more stringent enforcement of the law.8"
The important question which ought to be asked by the SEC
is whether the investor is provided with enough financial information to make an informed judgment to buy, sell, or hold. By
examining bribery in light of the four methods of determining
materiality discussed earlier, one could conclude that most foreign payments are material, not because they are improper, im85. Wall St. J., Aug. 26, 1975, at 2, col. 3.
86. Indeed, Stanley Sporkin, Director of the SEC's Division of Enforcement, is reported to have said at a recent seminar that some of the penalties in foreign countries for
bribery "scare the heck out of me. They throw the person away for long periods of time or
parts of his body away for long periods of time." Address by Stanley Sporkin, Seventh
Annual Institute on Securities Regulation, Practising Law Institute, New York City, Nov.
8, 1975, quoted in Brief for Respondents at 4, SEC v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., Misc. No.
75-0189 (D.D.C. Nov. 11, 1975).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol4/iss3/6

16

Chernick: Disclosure of Corporate Payments Abroad and the Concept of Materi

Materiality of Payments Abroad

moral, or illegal per se, but because they constitute important
items of economic data needed by the investor.
1.

Integrity of Management

Investors concerned with gauging the integrity and capability of management as an indicator of a company's possible success, would be interested in examining the means used in transacting business. An investor would have to examine the nature,
size, and origin of the bribe, contribution, or consultant's fee to
determine the purpose of the payment. A differentiation can be
made between money spent to acquire a contract, and money
spent after a contract is awarded to retain the business. As an
example of payments made to acquire business, Lockheed is reported to have spent as much as $3 million in order to sell each
$22 million plane.7 Investors might have assumed that the plane
sold well in Saudi Arabia, Canada, Great Britain, and Japan
because it is qualitatively superior to others which are similarly
priced. It has been reported, however, that government investigators believe that payoffs were involved in virtually every case, and
that these payoffs more likely explain the sales.8 That management employs payoffs as a means to secure sales, instead of using
the capital to improve the product, or conversely, to reduce the
per-plane cost in order to compete better, is information that
enables the shareholder to assess the quality and methods of
management. It is possible that shareholders will accept these
tactics and even demand that they continue, but it is nonetheless
a matter of great significance to the company, the shareholder,
and the prospective shareholder.
Even when management is opposed to the use of payoffs to
acquire business, a company may be coerced into bribery once
it has begun doing business in the host country. Columnist
William F. Buckley, Jr. reported, for example, that broadcasting
networks routinely bribe foreign officials "to facilitate the delivery of their precious cargo." 89 If customs laws in many countries
were strictly enforced, cans of video tape would have to be
searched for drugs which would delay the sending of newsfilms
and would soon put the networks out of the news business. The
87. NEWSWEEK, Aug. 18, 1975, at 63.

88. Id.
89. W. Buckley, Bribery International,Newsday, Dec. 20, 1975, at 17, col. 2.
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result is that "everybody does it."9 Gulfs former President Dorsey testified that his company had paid $200,000 "as the only
way" to obtain permits to operate an oil installation in which the
company had invested $150 million.'
These "after-the-fact" payments would be less likely to
alarm shareholders than the disclosure that management could
operate successfully only by buying contracts. An inefficient
management, driven to make a profit, may tender bribes to offset
its ineptitude, risking corporate assets and reputation in an effort
to maintain its position at the helm. This analysis could lead to
the conclusion that while payments of a few thousand dollars
made to acquire a contract might properly be regarded as material, payments of many thousands of dollars to expedite deliveries
(for example, cans of video film) might well be immaterial.
2.

A Significant Number of Shareholders Want Information

The Commission could adopt Judge Weinstein's suggestion
in Feit v. Leasco Data ProcessingEquipment Corp.1 2 and apply
it to the question of bribery. The test that information is material
if there is a "substantial likelihood" that an investor "may" want
to know, arguably is met if more than an insubstantial number
of shareholders regard the information as important. This approach recognizes that investors have changing needs, and therefore data once considered only peripherally useful may now be
more highly regarded. Investment decisionmaking will never be
risk-free nor can the Commission (or anyone, for that matter)
know with certainty all the information investors need for successful evaluation. The Commission can only surmise which data
is useful and require its disclosure. Investors might, for example,
consider it necessary to inquire about any payments made for
permits or licenses, the denial of which would cause economic
harm. Should more than an incidental number of shareholders
decide that a pattern of extortionate demands is significant in
determining risk, their desire to obtain relevant information
would cause immaterial data to become material.
Gulf's President Dorsey was solicited in 1966 for a $1 million
campaign contribution to President Park of South Korea, which
90. Id.
91. wall St. J., May 2, 1975, at 1, col. 6.
92. 332 F. Supp. 544, 571 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); see notes 50-54 supraand accompanying

text.
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he eventually made.93 Assuming that the payment was legal
(which it apparently was not), the contribution, per se, may not
have been material. In 1970, however, Mr. Dorsey was solicited
for a contribution of $10 million, and when he was convinced that
the company's holdings in the country were in jeopardy, he negotiated a $3 million contribution. 4 This payment could be material because it was directly related to the economic survival of
substantial assets of the corporation. The difference between
these two contributions is that an average investor is likely to
regard the latter payment to be of greater significance to the
question of investment security, and consequently to the decision
to buy, sell, or hold, than the earlier donation. An investor may
view the second payment as clear evidence of a developing pattern of extortionate demands on the company. Likewise, a political contribution or the use of "whitemail"-philanthropic gestures-might be useful to maintain good relations and good will,
whereas extortionate demands, which fluctuate with political
pressures, could foretell future financial problems. Clearly then,
the line between these distinctions, and their consequential effect
on materiality, will at times blur. One safeguard would be to call
for the release of pertinent information whenever a significant
number of shareholders decide that there is a substantial likelihood that their decisionmaking may depend upon the released
information.
Under this analysis the SEC would relinquish some responsibility for deciding what is important for the investing public to
know. Information would not be material because it is in fact
useful for investment evaluation, but because substantial numbers of investors, notwithstanding the judgment and experience
of professional analysts and the Commission, perceive it to be of
importance to their decisionmaking process.
The SEC's failure to respond to investor needs may have
been a factor considered by millions of investors who have deserted the market place in the past three years. 5 The SEC is
charged by Congress with the responsibility of providing infor93. NFWSWEFK, May 26, 1975, at 6.
94. Id.
95. Wall St. J., Nov. 12, 1975, at 33, col. 4. A poor market is an obvious factor. James
Needham, Chairman of the New York Stock Exchange believes that it could also be
evidence of disenchantment with the management of the national economy by people who
have traditionally had faith in the private enterprise system. Id.
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mation to investors" so that they will have the confidence to
invest." It accomplishes this by supplying to investors that
which the Commission in good faith decides investors need to
know. When controversy surrounds "soft data,"-information
not directly related to profits and losses-the decision of what
is materially significant to the investor can best be determined
by the SEC, together with the recommendations and requests
of the investing public.
3.

The Degree of Risk

The "degree of risk" criterion is perhaps of most importance
to the investor in determining the materiality of a given bribe,
contribution, or consultant's fee. That standard attempts to assess the impact of the payment on the business involved, taking
into account its size in relation to the company's assets in that
country and in the world-at-large; the result if payments were
stopped or the name of the recipient made public; and whether
payments were made to officials at the highest level of government who may soon be out of office,9" or to low level officials such
as bureaucrats with ministerial duties.
In the case of United Brands, the payment of $1.25 million
may not have been significant in relation to the company's size.9"
Once that payment was disclosed, however, the company's tax
and trade concessions in Honduras were revoked and its stock
dropped 40 percent in value.' The State Department has expressed concern that a company which has been linked with payments might have property in another country expropriated, not
because of misconduct in that country, "but simply on the
grounds that it was an undesirable firm."'' 1 Indeed, United
Brands' holdings in Panama were later expropriated.0 2 Therefore,
while an original payment may be relatively small, it could precipitate an injurious snowball effect to the corporation and be
96. See notes 3-7 supra and accompanying text.
97. See note 16 supra.
98. Gulf made payoffs of $350,000 in Bolivia and gave the President a $110,000 helicopter, Not long after the President died in a helicopter crash, the new regime expropriated Gulf's holdings. Now that the bribe has been disclosed, Bolivia is threatening to
withhold $57 million owed to Gulf in indemnity. FORTUNE, supra note 1, at 124.
99. The United Brands Company had consolidated net sales in 1974 of $2,020,526,000.
United Brands Company Annual Report at 3 (1974).
100. Gwirtzman, supra note 62, at 100, col. 1.
101. Statement by Mark Feldman, Deputy Legal Adviser, Dep't of State, before the
Subcomm. on Int'l Policy of the House Comm. on Int'l Relations, June 5, 1975, at 2,
reprinted in DEP'T OF STATE BULL., June 7, 1975, at 40.
102. Gwirtzma'n, supra note 62, at 100, col. 1.
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responsible for substantial economic harm. The United Brands
executives had what they believed to be the best interests of their
stockholders in mind when they decided to purchase favorable
tax treatment. This does not, however, lessen the significance and
therefore the materiality of the decision.
Much of the controversy at the time of this writing concerns
the extent of disclosure of bribery that is truly helpful to investors. Lockheed, for example, has argued that public revelation of
the names of bribe recipients (or even the names of the countries
in which they were paid), would jeopardize the safety of the officials involved, the company's present and future contracts, and
perhaps its corporate existence.1 3 Secret testimony before the
SEC would also be inadequate because the Freedom of Information Act allows public access after the investigation is completed. 104
The SEC has adopted a general policy which allows companies that volunteer information about illicit activities to "probably" escape enforcement action by the agency."0 5 What this policy
fails to recognize is that companies which come forward on their
own volition may succeed in avoiding disclosure of sufficient data
pertaining to the degree of risk to be meaningful to investors.,"5
Conversely, the Commission vigorously seeks countries, names,
and amounts from noncomplying corporations when in fact the
information may be extraneous, or not necessarily crucial, to an
evaluation of risk.'"7 The SEC justifies its reliance upon voluntary
compliance on the basis of the inability of its small legal staff to
police all companies.' This policy appears to conflict with the
legislative purpose to supply sufficient information to investors.
103. N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1976, at 1, col. 5. Following public disclosure of Lockheed's
bribes, see note 115 infra, a $1.3 billion contract in Japan for planes which the company
had "high hopes" of securing was lost. Wall St. J., Feb. 13, 1976, at 12, col. 2. The
company also feared losing a $750 million contract with the Canadian government, although the company claims to have salvaged the sale. N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1976, at 45,
col. 5.
104. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. 1976).
105. N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1976, at 39, col. 8; Wall St. J., Sept. 9, 1975, at 1, col. 6.
106. One SEC lawyer reports that most of the disclosures made in response to the
Commission's voluntary cooperation program have been so insignificant that they "should
never have come in." Wall St. J., Mar. 29, 1976, at 26, col. 1. Imprecise disclosure standards have encouraged some corporations to furnish needless details, and at the same time
have enabled other companies to avoid appropriate disclosure. Id.
107. N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1976, at 39, col. 8; Wall St. J., Sept. 9, 1975, at 1, col. 6.
108. See M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHIcs IN AN ADVERSARY SYsTEM 21 (1975). See also
Smith, supra note 1, at 1, col. 1.
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Generic disclosure has been suggested as a possible solution.0' Under this system, a company would be required to describe in general terms the kinds of activities in which it had
engaged. Former Commissioner Sommer, mindful of the harm
which might result from the indiscriminate release of information, has proposed the tailoring of a disclosure pattern in which
the company would inform the SEC and investors that it was
engaged in certain illicit practices in the host country, the extent
to which the business overseas depended upon or was secured as
a result of the payments, and the consequences which would
probably occur were the bribes to cease."0 In short, generic disclosure would reveal the impact of the payments and their import
to the business involved. Names of recipients and countries would
not be included."' This proposal confronts the fundamental issue:
whether, with respect to each given situation, the shareholder, or
would-be shareholder, is adequately apprised in order to make an
intelligent investment decision. A company would disclose the
extent to which it relied upon means other than performance and
pricing to sell its goods, the relative position in the government
of persons aiding the company, the amount of earnings generated,
and the amount of investment capital involved in the country.
The company would thus reveal as much information as a reasonable investor "might" need to know in order to evaluate that
company's relative stability and prospects, while at the same
time there would be a sensitivity toward the possible adverse
effects which would flow from indiscriminate disclosure."'
When it was first revealed that several companies were engaged in widespread bribery, corporate executives claimed that
such conduct was necessary to conduct their business in certain
parts of the world."' If American corporations were to be prohibited from making bribes, or compelled to disclose specific information about such continued practices, foreign decisionmakers
109. See, e.g., Peloso, Is Generic Disclosure of Secret, Illegal Funds a Possible
Solution?, 174 N.Y.L.J. 114, Dec. 15, 1975, at 25, col. 3.
110. Sommer, The Limits of Disclosure, supra note 61.
111. Id.
112. Cities Service Company reported in a Form 8-K that it had spent $30,000 "in a
foreign country" for political purposes and disclosed that the "legality [of the payments
is] not free from doubt." The company indicated that "a subsidiary operating overseas
paid $15,000 . . . to a lobbyist in the country of the subsidiary's operation." The Cities
Service 8-K is probably an indication of the minimum type of disclosure that the SEC
will permit. Cities Service Co., Form 8-K, Commission File No. 1-1093, Sept. 1975.
113. See notes 77-82 supra and accompanying text.
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might fear doing business with Americans.' They might choose,
instead, to deal with companies from countries which posed no
threat of revealing embarrassing information. Generic disclosure
would take both the company executive and the SEC at their
word. If business cannot be transacted without making these payments, this proposal would allow the practice to continue relatively free from harm to the company or host officials. If the SEC
is genuinely concerned about protecting investors, limited disclosure would adequately inform the investor of the degree of risk
involved. This alternative contains an inherent risk"5 since it
cannot guarantee anonymity to the bribe recipients. The limitation on the specificity of the disclosure may, however, lessen their
fears of negotiating with Americans and cause no appreciable loss
of business to companies of other industrial countries.
Under a system of generic disclosure, United Brands"' would
have had to disclose that an extremely high official had been paid
to prevent substantial harm to the company in a country where
it derives a certain percentage of its earnings and where major
holdings remain. It would, consequently, have had to warn investors what was at stake. Critics of generic disclosure contend that
such an alternative is dangerous to the company and inadequate
to serve the interests of the investor. Each is vulnerable because
full disclosure of all the facts, including the name of the bribe
recipient, may occur inadvertently-few transactions are absolutely secret. It is also possible that someone will correctly
deduce which country and persons are involved." 7 Alternatively,
114. There are already reports that foreign firms are claiming that they have a competitive advantage over American companies in the international market because host
governments are reluctant to do business with Americans. Wall St. J., Mar. 18, 1976, at
1, col. 6.
115. Lockheed has been particularly concerned that the names of recipients not be
revealed. The Senate Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations had subpoenaed certain documents but the Corporation refused to comply. Ironically, the attorneys for Lockheed's independent auditors accidentally sent a parcel of documents to the subcommittee,
including the very ones the company had tried to keep secret. The material was
subsequently made public and is highly embarrassing to the government of the Netherlands, because it implicates Prince Bernhard in a bribe of $1.1 million, and to JapaneseAmerican relations because it reveals that Lockheed paid $7 million "in commissions" to
an influential Japanese rightist whose positions run contrary to American foreign policy.
N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1976, § 4 (The Week in Review), at 3, cols. 2, 3.
116. See note 64 supra and accompanying text.
117. When a witness testified at Senate hearings in December 1975 that a "high
government official" of the Netherlands received a million dollar bribe from Lockheed,
many people suspected that Prince Bernhard was the unnamed recipient. Two months
later, the Dutch Prime Minister announced that the speculation was in fact true; it was

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1976

23

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 3 [1976], Art. 6
Law Review
Hofstra
[Vol. 4, 1976]

752

if not enough is made known, disclosure will be obscure and offer
little guidance. One group arguing this position has stated
that: 1 1
[Tihe consequences of short-term shielding for high-risk activity would be worse than early disclosure since the shielding
might have only the effect of encouraging the activities through
creating a false sense of security that would be only short-lived.
Short-lived or not, the SEC is neither responsible for, nor able
to make, investments safe or risk-free. The requirement that the
risks involved be disclosed will enable the investor to determine
what course of action to take. As former Chairman Garrett has
said: "If appropriate and complete disclosure has been made, the
Commission's role is, and should be, at an end.""'
4. Inaccurate or Incomplete FinancialRecords
The materiality of foreign payments is most evident when
analyzed by examining the accuracy and completeness of finanhave usually been made with monies from
cial records. Payments
20
"slush funds"'

created by kickback schemes, 2 ' phony billings
for consultant and other services,2 2 rebates,I2 and falsified ex-

penditures." 4 These kinds of activities are not likely to be
included in publicly recorded financial records.
the Prince who was and still is under investigation. TIME, Feb. 23, 1976, at 34.
118. Petition of Project on Corporate Responsibility, at 15, Dec. 10, 1975.
119. FORTUNE, supra note 1, at 200.
120. It is not known how widespread the existence of slush funds is, however, Stanley
Sporkin says that "the genius of CREEP [the Committee to Reelect the President] was
in knowing who had slush funds." Id. at 123.
121. Lockheed has admitted the use of kickback schemes; indeed it preferred to
characterize the payments as kickbacks and not as bribes, on the theory that it may be
able to deduct kickbacks from its taxes, while it may not deduct bribes. N.Y. Times, Oct.
10, 1975, at 53, col. 8.
122. Ashland Oil Company made substantial payments overseas to consultants and
legal representatives. The payments were later funneled back into the United States to
be used for illegal political contributions. Washington Post, June 7, 1975, at A-1, col. 1.
Northrop Corporation consented to an SEC complaint that the Company had laundered $476,000 through a French consultant for political contributions between 1961 and
1973. The SEC also charged that Northrop had inadequately accounted for $30 million in
consultant fees which the company had spent between 1971 and 1973. Id.
See also Report to the Board of Directors of Northrop Corporation on the Special
Investigation of the Executive Committee, July 16, 1975, a copy of which is on file at the
office of the Hofstra Law Review.
123. See Prospectus of the Exxon Pipeline Co., Oct. 16, 1975, at 29-32.
124. Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company, for example, accumulated
cash by making false entries in books and then used the money for domestic campaign
contributions. SEC v. Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co., 75 Civ. 29 (D.D.C. Jan. 10, 1975).
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The integrity of books and records, like that of management,
is an indication of the kinds of individuals leading the corporation. Falsification renders the financial accounting system necessarily unreliable and investors are frustrated if they attempt to
evaluate the true financial picture. Several commissioners vigorously support this last test and indeed it is applicable to most
bribery situations reported so far.rs SEC Chairman Hills, for
example, would categorize all payments as material, including
those which would otherwise be termed immaterial "if management has deliberately concealed a large sum of money from the
board, from the stockholders or from the audit committee," thus
26
creating a "distortion" of the financial reporting system.
The issue of how much is a "large sum" should not be determined by any strict quantitative test. The existence of a continuous pattern of activity may, for instance, be more revealing to the
investor than the falsification or concealment of a particular
amount.
The ramifications of inaccurate or incomplete recordkeeping
extend to tax liability as well. Deductions improperly taken for
spurious expenses could result in taxation and an imposition of
penalties at a later time. At least two corporations have voluntarily come forward to the SEC to disclose tax violations.'1
MATERIALITY MUST BE ROOTED IN TERMS OF ECONOMIC

SIGNIFICANCE

The Commission recently outlined its views on the subject of
disclosure of information relating to environmental protection,
2
equal employment, and other "corporate social practices."'
This action was taken pursuant to an order by District Judge
Charles Richey that the Commission carefully consider proposals
to expand disclosure requirements.' 2' The Commission, in Securi125. Loomis, supra note 61; Sommer, supra note 61.
126. N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1976, § 3 (National Economic Survey), at 33, cols. 1, 3.
127. American Home Products Corp., Form 8-K, Oct. 1975; Cities Service Corp.,
Form 8-K, Commission File Number 1-1093, Sept. 1975.
128. Proposed Environmental Disclosures, [Current] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
80,310 (Oct. 14, 1975).
129. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 389 F. Supp. 689 (D.D.C.
1974). The petitioners were the Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the Project on
Corporate Responsibility, Inc., and the Center on Corporate Responsibility, Inc. They
claimed, and Judge Richey held, that the SEC had failed to comply with the Administrative Procedure Act when the Commission formulated and promulgated regulations concerning disclosure of environmental and equal employment practices. The earlier releases
were SEC Securities Act Release Nos. 5235 and 5386.
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ties Act Release No. 5627, reiterated the objective of the Act
"[t]o provide full and fair disclosure."''3 The release noted that
the Securities Acts and legislative history suggested that "a
prime expectation of the Congress was that the Commission's
disclosure authority would be used to require the dissemination
' 3
of information which is or may be economically significant." ' '
The Commission also stressed the view that although its role is
to require disclosure which is "necessary or appropriate in the
public interest,"'3 2 the SEC's authority does not extend to permit33
ting disclosure for the sole purpose of promoting social goals.'
These "social goals" would presumably include corporate morality.
For investors to make meaningful use of information disclosed for their benefit, there must be a limit on the quantity of
material offered to them by publicly held corporations, and a
greater emphasis on the quality and helpfulness of the data. In
the Pentagon Papers case,' 34 Justice Stewart, in a concurring
opinion, warned the Government that once "everything is classified, then nothing is classified."13 Similarly, groups seeking the
expansion of the concept of materiality must be cognizant of the
real possibility that once everything is material, then nothing is
material. In Securities Act Release No. 5627, the Commission
recognized that "it is impossible to provide every item of information that might be of interest to some investor in making investment and voting decisions."' 38 In fact, it is quite likely that too
much disclosure serves to keep investors as much in the dark as
does too little disclosure.' 3 The Commission was therefore
correct in refusing to mandate the disclosure of some 100 new
topics,'38 largely pertaining to social matters, as requested by
130. Proposed Environmental Disclosures, [Current] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. T
80,310, at 85,710 (Oct. 14, 1975), quoting the preamble to the Securities Act of 1933.
131. Id. at 85,710. (emphasis added).
132. Id. at 85,711.
133. NAACP v. Federal Power Comm'n, No. 75-1959 (D.C. Cir., Feb. 5, 1975).
134. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 729 (1971).
135. Id.
136. Proposed Environmental Disclosures, [Current] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
80,310, at 85,712 (Oct. 14, 1975).
137. Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 565 (E.D.N.Y.
1971); Gould v. American Hawaiian Steamship Co., 331 F. Supp. 981, 996 (D. Del. 1971)
(the "buried facts doctrine"). See also Mann, Prospectuses: Unreadableor Just Unread?-A Proposalto Reexamine PoliciesAgainst PermittingProjections, 40 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 222 (1971).
138. Proposed Environmental Disclosures, [Current] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
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the public interest group Natural Resources Defense Council.,"
One illuminating reason given was that petitioning groups
would use the information primarily to determine how to vote
their proxies and influence management policies, rather than
how to make investment decisions.4 0 The SEC, one could conclude, concerns itself more with the fundamental question of
whether there is adequacy of disclosure in order to buy or sell a
security than with whether investors have access to information
to influence the internal affairs of a company.
The Commission has rightfully refused to expand the seemingly limitless concept of materiality to areas which are not of
principal economic concern to the investing public. Where the
demand for information is, however, clearly based upon a need
for financial data, the Commission has responded by proposing
that such direct impact "upon the capital expenditures, earnings
and competitive position""' of the company involved be disclosed. If the SEC is to accept the new responsibility of providing information about public corporations on any and all matters, additional legislation must be sought in Congress. Until
such time, it must concentrate on determining what basic information investors need to know for investment decisionmaking
and seek to compel its disclosure.
The very function of materiality is to distinguish, for purposes of investment, the pertinent from the extraneous and the
significant from the insignificant.' Many facts concerning a
company may be helpful or interesting yet they are not essential,
and thus not material. Materiality must, therefore, be grounded
first in terms of an economic function, for otherwise the item
could not be said to be vital in the investment decisionmaking
process.
Revelations regarding corporate expenditures for illegal and
questionable purposes often result in greater harm to the corporation than the benefits that are sought. Adverse consequences are
not limited to the country in which improprieties occur.' Other
80,310, at 85,724-25 (Oct. 14, 1975).
139. Some of the terms submitted included: charitable contributions, "good things a
company has done," degree of commitment to a human community, any activity likely
to lead to litigation, and all agency actions. Id. at 85,724 n.72.
140. Id. at 85,721-22.
141. CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 31,103 at 22,054.
142. 1 CCH APB ACCOUNTINC PRINCIPLES, 1022.17 at 136 (1971).
143. See note 102 supra and accompanying text.
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countries, concerned with their own image, may refrain from
dealing with a company whose reputation has been damaged.'44
As a result, the company and the shareholder suffer. Illicit payments, alluringly beneficial in the short run, may severely affect
a company's good relations with the host country, impairing the
stability, growth, and profits that investors seek. Bribery can
therefore constitute a material matter of economic concern to
persons weighing investment decisions.
CONCLUSION

The determination of materiality is necessarily a complex
question of judgment; not merely a mechanical process. While
the Commission should refuse to allow the expansion of materiality to include noneconomic areas, it must also recognize that the
notion of what is useful or necessary is not static, but susceptible
to change.'45 This becomes more apparent as investors devise new
means to evaluate corporate prospects. Where the Commission is
unsure of the importance to investment analysis that a new item
may provide, the SEC must give more careful consideration to
the desires of the ultimate user of the information-the investing
public.
The controversial subject of bribery should not cause the
perplexity that it has at the SEC and in the securities community.'4 6 Viewing the issue in terms of traditional analysesamounts in question, legality of the payments, or nonenforcement of antibribery laws by host countries-is inadequate. Even
if data could be ascertained for these modes of analysis, the
obtained facts would not be meaningful to investors and thus
would not be useful. If approached with a more qualitative analysis-what do the payments reveal about the integrity and quality
of management and corporate records, what is the economic consequence of a particular course of conduct, what does the investor
need to know for intelligent investment analysis-answers can be
144. See note 103 supra and accompanying text.
145. The recent decision to initiate replacement-cost disclosure requirements to reveal the impact of inflation on the nation's largest companies is a significant and welcomed development. This proposed change represents a step away from historical-cost
accounting which provides precise valuation, but it fails to recognize that inflation distorts the accuracy of any replacement-cost figure. John C. Burton, the SEC's Chief
Accountant, praised the measure, and urged "greater tolerance for imprecision." Wall St.
J., Mar. 25, 1976, at 6, cols. 2-3.
146. SEC Chairman Hills has acknowledged the present state of confusion. N.Y.
Times, Jan. 4, 1976, § 3 (National Economic Survey) at 33, col. 2.
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found and a service will be performed for the investor.
The more difficult problem facing the SEC is to determine
what information investors need and how the Commission can47
best service those needs. Decline in the number of investors,
coupled with an expected shortage of capital,"' portends a potentially graver crisis.
Professor Kripke may be correct when he calls for reassessment of the basic premises of the Act of 1933:
They [the economists] are telling us that the Commission's rhetoric which appears in release after release is a myththe idea that the individual investor can exercise an "informed
investment judgment" on a single company if given "all the
facts" in a prospectus. They are telling us that the disclosure
system -the idea that the small investor or even the professional149can pick securities that do better than others-does not
work.

There is no doubt, however, that disclosure's secondary function-affecting conduct-is more successful. Corporations in the
center of the foreign payments storm are already replacing top
management 5 " and vowing to abstain totally from previous practices.'5- This may be a mere public relations effort, or perhaps a
genuine attempt to rectify undesirable conduct. The oft-quoted
comment by Justice Brandeis is again appropriate: "Sunlight is
147. See note 95 supra and accompanying text.
148. The Capital Crisis: The $4.5 TrillionAmerica Needs to Grow, Bus. WEEK, Sept.
22, 1975, at 42.
In his State of the Union message, President Ford proposed incentives to encourage
low and middle income wage earners to buy common stocks. He would allow individuals
or employers to establish stock-purchase plans in which the contributions would be tax
deductible. Wall St. J., Jan. 20, 1976, at 3, col. 1.
149. Kripke, Wrap-Up, 29 Bus. LAW. 185, 189 (Mar. 1974).
150. Although several companies have discharged their top executives, many have
retained the discharged officers as consultants or directors. Gulf Oil Corporation's Board
of Directors forced the resignation of its chairman, Bob R. Dorsey, although they said there
was no basis to conclude that he was aware of all the illegality involved. Thomas V. Jones
of the Northrop Corporation resigned as chairman, but remains as president and chief
executive and is struggling against the board's efforts to find a new president; Russel De
Young resigned as Goodyear's chairman, but still serves on an important committee. Fines
were paid by board chairmen at Carnation Company and Braniff International. TIME, Jan.
26, 1976, at 59.
151. Several companies-including Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing, Northrop, Gulf, Ashland, and Phillips-have agreed to cease violating the disclosure rules. The
consent agreements which have been entered require the filing of public reports tracing
illegal expenditures or payments which were improperly accounted for. Wall St. J., Sept.
9, 1975, at 1, col. 6.
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said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman."' 52
The practice of making corporate payments to foreign officials, once overlooked or quietly tolerated, may become, in light
of a changing national consciousness, a course of conduct no
longer condoned. If the American people choose to impose strict
standards of morality on business transactions abroad, appropriate substantive laws will have to be enacted by Congress. Should
this path be taken, however, some countries will not fully appreciate our effort to "export morality."'53
The SEC, established to assist investors by compelling disclosure of information necessary for investment decisionmaking,
is not empowered to regulate conduct it deems undesirable. If,
however, the process of revealing information pertaining to a
company's financial condition also results in the elevation of corporate morality, an additional valid purpose is served. To the
extent that the Commission seeks information to enable investors
to better evaluate the risk and quality of an issue, the SEC is not
overstepping its authority, but, on the contrary, is performing its
assigned role.
Charles M. Chernick
BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY 62 (1933).
153. The State Department expressed the view that attempts to pass antibribery laws
to protect Americans against the "sins of foreign countries" will be met in some countries
with resentment. There is some suspicion in Central America that the Commission's
concern for disclosure is in reality a cover story. The SEC's real interest, it is there
believed, is to substitute itself for the CIA in overthrowing local governments, as the CIA
is preoccupied at present with its own problems of allegations of impropriety. R. Garrett,
supra note 61, at 16, 17.

152. L.
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